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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 981871-CA

vs.
JAMES SCOTT WALLBERG,

Priority No. 2

Defendant and Appellant.
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Pursuant to order of this Court dated December 28, 2000, the State submits this
Second Supplemental Brief in response to the Second Supplemental Brief of Appellant.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
REQUEST FOR COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL
In State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278,282 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court held that
the trial court should appoint counsel and provide necessary transcripts if payment of such
by a defendant "would place an undue hardship on the defendant's ability to provide the
basic necessities of life for the defendant and the defendant's family." The court in Vincent
held that in making that determination, trial courts should consider:
"employment status and earning capacity; financial aid from family or friends,
financial assistance from state and federal programs; [the defendant's]
necessary living expenses and liabilities; [the defendant's] unencumbered
assets, or any disposition thereof; and, the relative amount of court costs to be
waived."
1

Id. at 283-84 {quoting Kelsey v. Hanson, 818 P.2d 590, 591-92 (Utah App. 1991)) (brackets
in original and footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court refused to further define indigency,
deeming it "unwise to rush to factual specificity as to what constitutes legal 'indigency.'"
Id. at 282. In "loosely defining] indigency," the high court "creat[ed], in the terms of the
metaphor used in Pena, a rather broad pasture for trial judges applying the law of indigency
to the facts before them." Id. A review of the facts before the trial court here reveals that
its decision was well within that "rather broad pasture."
The trial court here learned that as a result of a disability, defendant received a social
security check for $928 each month. R. 09; R. 174: 5-6. Defendant listed eight dependents
in his application for court-appointed counsel. R. 09. Upon inquiry at the hearing, the court
learned that the eight dependents included seven children and defendant. R. 174: 5. When
the court asked defendant whether he was currently paying for the support of those children,
defendant responded in the affirmative. R. 174: 5. Upon further inquiry, however, and after
the prosecutor stated her belief that some, if not all, of the children were in the State's
custody, defendant conceded that his children were in fact receiving separate payments from
the federal government under his disability benefits for their support. See R. 174: 7-8.
In the Second Supplemental Brief of Appellant (Supp.2d), defendant contends that
under federal law, "an incarcerated person may lose all Federal benefit payments during his
incarceration, [and] thus even had [he] been able to persuade an attorney to represent him and
take payments, he would likely have lost his sole source of income once imprisoned."
Supp.2d at 1 -2. Defendant fails to cite any authority supporting that proposition, nor is there
2

any evidence in the record suggesting that he did not continue to receive those benefits
through trial and beyond. See Supp.2d at 1-2. Federal law in fact provides that a social
security recipient loses his eligibility for monthly disability benefits only ifhe is incarcerated
or imprisoned as a result of a conviction or if he is otherwise confined after being adjudged
incompetent to stand trial. 42 U.S.C. § 402(x)(l)(A) (1991 & Supp. II1994). Accordingly,
defendant would have been eligible to receive at least five more monthly disability payments
benefits. See R. 73-74.1
The court also considered the cash available to defendant at the time. In his
application for court-appointed counsel, defendant listed $600 as cash on hand or in banks.
R. 09. However, at the indigency hearing on May 16,1995, the prosecutor advised the court
that jail personnel had informed her they had inventoried more than $800 in cash from his
wallet at the time of his arrest. See R. 174: 6. When questioned about the discrepancy,
defendant conceded that "[i]t could have been approximately that" because he received his
disability checks on the third day of the month. R. 174: 6.
In support of his application, defendant advised the court that he had to pay for food
and rent and that he was required " to travel to California and to medical physicians for [his]
disability." R. 174: 8-9. He also asserted that he was required to pay his own prescription
drugs which "sometimes" cost him three to four hundred dollars a month. R. 174: 8.
Defendant did not, however, assert that he was required to pay that amount at that time, nor

*In fact, defendant was not sentenced to prison until some three years later because
he absconded from the initial sentencing. R. 73-74, 77.
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did he identify any other immediate expenses. See R. 174: 8. Nevertheless, and apparently
still uncertain as to defendant's financial responsibilities to his children, the trial court was
prepared to appoint counsel. SeeR. 174: 13.
As the trial judge began to appoint counsel, however, a public defender present at the
hearing, who had represented defendant in the past and who was aware of his financial
situation, intervened. R. 174:13. The public defender stated that defendant had a Medicaid
card for medical expenses. R. 174: 14. He also confirmed that defendant's monthly
disability check was not used for child support and he represented that defendant has "always
had income." R. 174:13. Defendant countered, volunteering for the first time that Medicare
paid for 85 percent of doctors visits and the "hospital co-charges." R. 174: 14.
After hearing from the public defender, the trial court concluded that defendant was
not entitled to court-appointed counsel. R. 174: 14. When defendant protested, the court
observed that appropriate arrangements could be made with an attorney for payment. R. 174:
14. Defendant now contends that the court's decision was improper because the trial court
incorrectly stated that an attorney could place a lien on defendant's social security check.
Supp.2d at 1. Defendant cites to no authority supporting that proposition. See Supp.2d at
1. In any event, the court's reference to such a lien was merely used as an example for the
court's general observation that procedures existed to assure attorneys of payment. See R.
174: 14.
Defendant also complains that it would have been difficult for him to locate an
attorney while he was incarcerated. Supp.2d at 1-2. That claim is not substantiated by any
4

record evidence and has never been considered as a factor in determining indigency. Indeed,
the difficulty in locating counsel because a defendant is incarcerated is irrelevant to
defendant's ability to pay for counsel. Moreover, while incarceration may hamper a
defendant's ability to secure an attorney, it does not prevent him from doing so, nor does it
preclude him from securing an attorney with the assistance of friends or family.
Finally, defendant observes that the monthly disability check fell below 150% of the
United States poverty level referenced in Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-202(3)(ii) (1999).
Supp.2d at 4. That statute, however, was not in effect at the time of the hearing and therefore
has no application. Moreover, based on defendant's figures, his annual disability benefits
were only $70 shy of exceeding 150% of the poverty level. See Supp.2d at 4.
* * *

Given defendant's monthly income of $928, his available cash on hand of $800, and
his failure to substantiate any current expenses of an extraordinary nature, the trial court
correctly navigated the "rather broad pasture" in "applying the law of indigency to the facts."
Vincent, 883 P.2d at 282. As noted above, the expenses identified by defendant were vague
and unsubstantiated. Defendant also failed to provide the information that was fatal in
Vincent, conceding that he "d[id] [not] know how much counsel costs." R. 174: 14. As
observed in Vincent, where no evidence is introduced showing the cost of counsel, "it is
impossible to determine a defendant's ability to pay those expenses." Vincent, 883 P.2d at
284. Accordingly, defendant failed to meet his burden in establishing indigency, and absent
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that evidence, the reviewing court cannot assume defendant was unable to pay for counsel.
See id. at 283-84.2
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in the State's other briefs, the State respectfully
requests that the Court affirm the conviction.
Respectfully submitted this

b f day of March, 2001.
JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

-REY S. GRAY
L S S I S T A N T ATTORNEY 6ENER
6ENERAL
Attorneys for Appellee, State of Utah
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We also learn from the transcript of the indigency hearing that the trial court's
previous appointments of counsel were subject to an assessment for attorneys fees if the
court determined later that defendant was able to pay for counsel. See R. 174: 9.
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